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I. INTRODUCTION
Society uses two competing social policy tools to enhance the welfare of its
workers: mandated benefits and tax-financed programs. Mandated benefits
are benefits that employers are legally required to provide to their workers,
such as parental leave. Tax-financed programs are benefits provided by the
government to employees that are financed by a targeted labor tax.
The use of mandated benefits has dramatically increased over the last
twenty years; mandated benefits are “coming from every different
angle”1 and “are virtually omnipresent in modern employment law.”2
However, these benefits are often predicated on mistaken beliefs
regarding their economic effects.3
1. Frank B. McArdle, Introduction: The Pressure for New Legislated Mandates,
in GOVERNMENT MANDATING OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS xxv, xxv (1987).
2. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 225 (2000).
3. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of
Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 908–09 (2001).

646

MARGOLIATH.DOC

[VOL. 40: 645, 2003]

1/14/2020 4:18 PM

The Many Faces of Mandates
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

One major reason for the proliferation of mandated benefits is the
naive belief that they are capable of redistributing wealth from
employers to employees. Lawrence Summers refuted this belief in a
paper recognized as the seminal work on the subject of mandated
benefits.4 He explained that employers shift the costs of providing the
benefits to their employees by reducing wages or by offering employees
lower fringe benefits. But Summers’s paper, and the literature that
followed it, gave an impression that mandated benefits might be better in
a certain respect than tax-financed programs.
According to this literature, mandates may produce less distortion than
tax-financed programs. A critical assumption behind this idea is that taxfinanced programs have a particular design, namely that participation in
them is not limited to employees. For some issues, such as health care,
this is almost certainly the most plausible assumption. Yet, it is not clear
why the government should impose taxes on employees to finance
benefits for nonemployees instead of using a general tax that would be
borne by all taxpayers. Such a tax would spread the costs of redistribution
more equally among all members of society according to their ability to
pay.5 For other issues, such as parental leave, the assumption that
It would seem that voters would have to be ignorant and legislators would have
to be either ignorant or venal to enact such universal mandates. . . .
....
. . . If universal mandates are enacted when it is relatively easy to see they
will accomplish nothing, what would we expect of accommodation mandates
that would be expected to harm their intended beneficiaries?. . . [T]he more
complicated the chain of causal inference, the less likely are group members to
perceive that something that on its face would appear to be beneficial will in
fact be harmful.
Id. For similar points, see also John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, The Economic
Effects of Employment Regulation: What Are the Limits?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION
OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 125, 125–26 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997);
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL
INSURANCE 294 (1999).
[W]hen taxes are levied or payments otherwise required from employers,
individual workers usually bear the burden of these payments, even if the
workers don’t see it that way. Politicians often also ignore this basic economic
truth in an effort to reap political gain from masking the tax burdens of
employees. To a politician confronted with the necessity to raise revenue, the
best tax is one that everyone thinks someone else is paying.
Id.; Jolls, supra note 2, at 226–27.
4. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 177 (1989).
5. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN
PUBLIC ECONOMY 61–73 (1959) (providing a classic presentation of the ability-to-pay
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participation in the tax-financed program is not limited to employees
seems potentially unreasonable.
Summers fully recognized the role of this assumption in his argument.
At one point, he wrote:
[S]uppose that the public parental leave program was exactly tied to the number
of hours an employee worked in the past and to his or her wage. In this case,
with rational employees, the program would not be distortionary because the
extra parental leave one would get by working more hours would offset the
extra tax payments. Mandated benefits have effects paralleling benefit taxfinanced public programs. Without close links between taxes and benefits, that
tend to be lacking in public programs, large distortions can result.6

Summers may be right in asserting that public programs lack close links
between taxes and benefits in some important circumstances. However,
in other programs, such as parental leave—an example Summers himself
uses—such links will often exist.
The way in which academic literature has dealt with Summers’s paper
ignores the source of difference in efficiency between mandated benefits
and tax-financed programs and makes a general assumption that mandated
benefits are more efficient. Tax-financed programs are perceived to
entail a “deadweight loss” that does not exist in mandated benefits.7
The first argument made in this Article is that there is no fundamental
difference in efficiency between tax-financed programs and mandated
benefits, as they are both susceptible to the same type of deadweight loss
and can both be equally efficient. Any difference in efficiency between
the two social policy tools is the outcome of a specific design that is
most likely intended. Policymakers may often use taxes to promote
redistribution goals. If tax-financed programs are used for such a
purpose while mandated benefits are not, it is obvious that the former
involves greater distortion than the latter.
This does not mean, however, that mandated benefits are superior to
tax-financed benefits. When evaluating social policy tools, society must
consider both efficiency (minimizing distortions) and equity (redistribution
to enhance equality).8 Tax-financed programs may be more distortive
approach). See generally Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967) (pointing out the importance of
including all sources of income in the tax base).
6. Summers, supra note 4, at 181.
7. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84
AM. ECON. REV. 622, 622 (1994) (“Aside from their political attraction, there may be an
efficiency argument for mandates, relative to public expenditure, as a means of financing
benefit expansions. As highlighted by Lawrence H. Summers (1989), publicly financed
benefits require an increase in government revenue-raising, with the resulting deadweight
loss from taxation.”).
8. One might alternatively consider efficiency to include redistributive goals by
viewing efficiency as the maximization of a social welfare function.
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because of their specific design, but considering this as an advantage
while ignoring redistribution effects leads to a meaningless policy
analysis. Rather, the inefficiency may be a price that society is willing to
pay for redistribution that maximizes society’s social welfare function.9
The second argument made in this Article explores the possible
unintended redistribution effects of mandated benefits. Christine Jolls
has shown that if the restrictions on wage and employment levels
imposed by antidiscrimination laws are binding, mandated benefits may
redistribute wealth from all employees to the group of employees that is
protected by the antidiscrimination laws.10
This Article will show that certain mandated benefits, such as pension
vesting and overtime pay rules, might have an opposite effect. If
restrictions on wage and employment differentials hold, then groups we
would normally want to redistribute to, such as women and lower
compensated employees, will be made worse off.
To understand the analysis in this Article, the reader first needs some
background on how mandated benefits affect wages and employment
levels. Therefore, Part II will assess a number of cases that will be
important in analyzing the arguments made later in this Article.
Part III covers another introductory issue—the justification for the
government’s intervention in the labor market. This Part will make two
novel points that are not part of the Article’s main arguments. These two
points criticize a common argument made in both the economic and legal
literature:11 If employees’ wages decrease by an amount that is equivalent
to the full cost of the provided mandated benefit, so that the employment
level does not decrease after the enactment of the mandated benefit, it is a
sign that the enactment was efficient.12 This is referred to as the level-of9. See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary
Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 520 (1996) (“Knowledge that the aggregate
reform—the public good and the tax adjustment, taken together—causes distortion thus
provides little guidance, because the existence of distortion is associated with greater
redistribution.”); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax
Decisions: The Marginal Cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects, 54 NAT’L
TAX J. 189, 199 (2001) (“[N]either the distributional impact of proposals nor the
behavioral response to them should be ignored.”). See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN,
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
10. Jolls, supra note 2, at 243–55.
11. See, e.g., Dwight R. Lee, Teaching Tools: Why Workers Should Want Mandated
Benefits to Lower Their Wages, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 401, 402 (1996).
12. See generally Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated
Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Worker’s Compensation Insurance, in 5
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 111 (David Bradford ed., 1991).
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employment test. The argument is considered to be counterintuitive
because one might usually believe that employees are better off if
employers are not able to shift the costs of the mandate to them.
A classic example is the ongoing debate over Social Security. The tax
is equally divided between employers and employees, yet many people
already know that the legal division of the cost is irrelevant because the
burden will be borne according to the relative elasticities of supply and
demand for labor. But most of those better educated people, including
many politicians, believe that employees are better off—given relative
elasticities of supply and demand for labor—if employers bear most of
the tax. Employers are perceived as bearing the tax burden if wage rates
do not decrease, but this intuitive view is, in fact, misguided. If
employees bear the full cost, it is a sign that the employees value the
benefit more than its cost. Hence, the benefit is efficient and increases
employees’ welfare.
The first criticism of the level-of-employment test is that, because the
labor supply tends to be relatively inelastic, it might be difficult to
realistically distinguish between the following: (1) a case in which the
wages decreased by almost the full cost of the mandate because the
employees placed a high value on the mandate, meaning that the mandate
was efficient, and (2) a case in which the wages decreased by the full cost of
the benefit, not because of the value that employees placed on the benefit,
but merely because of the relative inelasticity of the labor supply.13
The second criticism is that a mandated benefit might be efficient even
if employees value the benefit provided to them at less than its cost
(hence employment level decreases) if the benefit had been enacted to
overcome an externality or if its underlying rationale was paternalism or
stemmed from the employees’ lack of information. In these situations, a
mandate may fail the level-of-employment test mentioned above yet be
perfectly efficient.

13. In a theoretical analysis employing graphs, any slope will yield employment
effect. Because it is not plausible that the labor supply would be perfectly inelastic, a
change in the employment rate is a good proxy for the efficiency of the mandated benefit.
In real life, we do not see graphs, and measuring the costs of providing the benefits
might be difficult at times. Thus, if the labor supply is relatively inelastic—as we know
the case to be—we may find it difficult to ascertain whether or not the wages fell by their
full cost. See Alan B. Krueger, Observations on Employment-Based Government
Mandates, with Particular Reference to Health Insurance, in LABOR MARKETS,
EMPLOYMENT POLICY, AND JOB CREATION 297, 311–12 (Lewis C. Solmon & Alec R.
Levenson eds., 1994) (assuming labor supply elasticity to be .1, with labor demand
elasticity to be -.5 in the insured sector and -.25 in the uninsured sector); cf. DANIEL S.
HAMERMESH, LABOR DEMAND 135 (1993) (noting that employment demand elasticity is
probably bracketed –.15 and –.75, with -.3 being a “good ‘best guess’”). Elasticity of
demand is a negative number, indicating that demand falls as the wage rate rises.
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Readers who are familiar with the literature on mandated benefits and who
have a basic understanding of labor economics are strongly encouraged
to skip Part II and to consider skipping Part III before going on to this
Article’s main arguments beginning with Part IV.
Part IV compares mandated benefits and tax-financed programs, finding
that both tools involve similar excess burden—deadweight loss—thus
stressing the point that Summers must have assumed a lack of close links
between taxes and benefits. Part V analyzes the redistributive effects from
employers to employees that mandated benefits might have. Part VI
discusses the interemployee redistributive effects that accommodation
mandates may entail. Part VII provides a few examples of certain types of
mandates that usually would conform to Jolls’s definition of
accommodation mandates, but that seem to go beyond the traditional
accommodation mandates due to perverse redistribution effects. The final
Part presents a unifying theme and offers some concluding remarks.
A. Two Notes Regarding Methodology
First, in order to fully evaluate the effects of mandated benefits on the
labor, capital, and product markets, a general equilibrium analysis is
required. Such an analysis takes into account the ways in which the
various markets are interrelated.14 However, general equilibrium
analysis is complicated, and some important insights can often be
learned from the relatively simple analysis of supply and demand curves
in one market, holding all other forces constant. This type of limited
analysis is termed partial equilibrium analysis and is commonplace in
law and economics articles.15

14. See generally Lars Bergman, The Development of Computable General
Equilibrium Modeling, in GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELING AND ECONOMIC POLICY
ANALYSIS (Lars Bergman et. al. eds., 1990).
15. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 271–79 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing
partial versus general equilibrium analysis in the context of taxation); see also EDWARD
E. ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 18 (1995) (noting that partial equilibrium
analyses “form the bulwark of applied economics”). The use of partial equilibrium
analysis is especially appropriate here because this Article analyzes industries and
mandated benefits in general; therefore, it is plausible to assume that competitive
markets do not allow for significant shifting of costs to consumers or curtailment of
employers’ profits. Analysis of a specific labor market, such as the fast food industry,
may require general equilibrium analysis. Moreover, a transition to general equilibrium
analysis may only affect our conclusions quantitatively by making the effects smaller,
but will not have qualitative effects. See Jolls, supra note 2, at 239.
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Second, the use of the standard economic theory, according to which a
mandate that does not reduce wage rates reduces the employment level,
may be subject to criticism based on findings of two prominent
economists, David Card and Alan Krueger. Their work, based on
empirical findings, challenges the conventional theory that minimum
wage laws increase unemployment rates.16 Much debate surrounds the
accuracy of the empirical methodologies that Card and Krueger used.
As for the theory, most economists believe that the conventional
assumption is still valid. However, they believe that small increases in
the minimum wage may not necessarily increase unemployment, as long
as the minimum wage does not exceed fifty percent of average hourly
earnings and rates of economic growth, labor productivity, level of
profits, and elasticity of demand for young workers do not change.17

16. See generally DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT:
THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995); David Card & Alan B. Krueger,
Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New
Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1397 (2000). But see Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, Review Symposium: Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the
Minimum Wage, Editor’s Introduction, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 827, 827 (1995)
(noting that “vituperative denunciations by critics of [Card and Krueger’s] findings”
have appeared in a wide range of publications). For additional critiques of the research
in Myth and Measurement (not included in the 1995 Industrial and Labor Relations
Review publication), see David Neumark & William Wascher, Employment Effects of
Minimum and Subminimum Wages: Reply to Card, Katz, and Krueger, 47 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 497 (1994); David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and
Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania:
Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1362 (2000); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the
Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1997).
17. However, if one were to develop a strong theory explaining why minimum
wage laws do not decrease employment, the theory would probably undermine the
validity of the analysis taken in this Article. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 911 (making
a similar comment regarding Jolls’s analysis).
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II. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
FIGURE 1

Wage
Rate

S
a

W
D
E

Worker-Hours

Wage rates are reflected on the vertical axis and worker-hours are
reflected on the horizontal axis of Figure 1. Because this Article uses a
partial equilibrium analysis, as did Summers and Jolls, other factors
affecting demand and supply, such as product demand schedule, capital
and technologies availability, and wages in other labor markets, are held
constant. On the demand side, D represents employers; on the supply
side, S represents employees and potential employees.18
The demand curve represents employers’ demand for worker-hours at
different wage levels. The curve slopes downward, indicating that as wages
rise, employers demand less labor. This is because employers are willing to
hire additional worker-hours as long as the additional income from the
extra hour exceeds the wages and other costs associated with hiring the
extra hour of labor, and that additional labor, at fixed rates of capital,
yields diminishing returns. Labor yields diminishing returns because
each additional worker has less capital and technologies with which to
work and because the each worker is performing less critical tasks, as
18.

The curves are drawn as lines for ease of illustration.
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previously hired worker-hours already performed the more critical tasks.
The supply curve represents the employees’ willingness to work at
different wage levels. The curve slopes upward, indicating that as wages
rise, employees and potential employees are willing to offer more
worker-hours.19 Point a, at which the S and D curves intersect, is the
market clearing wage. At this point, the wage is W and the number of
worker-hours provided is E.20
Because providing benefits is costly, the enactment of a mandated benefit
will increase employers’ wage costs.21 A general equilibrium analysis
portrays a shift of part of the incremental costs to consumers, in the form
of increased prices of products or services, and to employers, in the form
of reduced profits.22 A partial equilibrium analysis depicts only a shift to
the employees themselves, who pay for the mandated benefits they
receive either with nominal wage reductions or with decreases in
previously provided fringe benefits, such as free uniforms and
transportation, employer contributions to pension plans, or free food.23
Because of wage rigidities,24 the shift of costs from employers to
19. This is somewhat simplified; in certain parts, the supply curve might be
backward-bending, signifying that a rise in the wage rate will cause a decrease in
employment. This is due to the dominance of the income effect over the substitution
effect. The income effect results because leisure is a normal good. The more income
one has, the more leisure one wants to consume. The substitution effect results because
leisure becomes more expensive as the wage rate increases. The price of leisure is
its opportunity cost—the wage that could be earned if not for the consumption of
leisure—which equals the wage rate times hours of work. An upward sloping supply curve
assumes that the substitution effect dominates the income effect—due to the wage rate
increase, leisure becomes more expensive, so employees consume less of it.
20. For a more detailed description, see RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S.
SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 37–48 (7th ed. 2000); John J. Donohue III, Is Title
VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1412–15 (1986).
21. Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory
and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 89 n.146 (1988) (“Even those fringe benefits
which [are defined for tax purposes as] a ‘no-additional-cost-service’ (and which are,
therefore, excluded from income under [I.R.C.] section 132(a)) are costless only when
viewed from the narrowest possible perspective.”).
22. Such shifts are likely to be small, possibly negligible, at present competitive
markets.
23. Assume, for example, that a preexisting compensation package is comprised of
$20 per hour in monetary wage and $3 per worker-hour in fringe benefits. If a mandated
benefit that costs the employer $2 per hour is enacted, the employer may shift the cost of
the mandated benefit to the employees by decreasing either the monetary wage or the
level of the fringe benefits.
24. These include minimum wage laws, collective bargaining agreements that
restrict the employer’s ability to lower wages, and workplace norms and strategy. See
generally TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION (1999).
The general theme of Bewley’s book, which is based on interviews with executives, is
that employers are averse to cutting wages for fear of hurting employees’ morale, which
they feel is critical in gaining the cooperation of their employees and in convincing their
employees to internalize the managers’ objectives for the company. Id.
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employees may not take place in the short run. But in the long run,
employers will be able to shift the cost to employees by not raising their
wages and by offering lower fringe benefits.25 If such decreases do not
take place, because of a relative elasticity of the supply curve or because
of minimum wage laws, employees will suffer the consequences of a
decrease in demand for worker-hours—underemployment26 or
unemployment. Unemployment reduces the profits of employers as
well, but this does not mean that it improves the welfare of any of the
employees. Efficient economic transactions are win-win situations;
therefore, the fact that a mandated benefit reduces employers’ welfare
does not mean that the benefit aids employees.27
FIGURE 2

Wage
Rate

S
S’
a

W
W’
b

D
D’

E

Worker-Hours

25. The standard economic assumption, which is based on theory as well as
empirical studies, is that in the long run employees pay for the benefits they receive. See
EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 20, at 74–76; HAMERMESH, supra note 13, at 45–56;
David J. Brailer & R. Lawrence Van Horn, Health and the Welfare of U.S. Business, 71
HARV. BUS. REV. 125, 125–28 (1993); Gruber & Krueger, supra note 12, at 112–39.
26. In this context, underemployment can be defined as situations in which
employees work fewer hours than they desire.
27. See discussion infra Part V.
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As previously mentioned, employers will hire employees up to the
point at which the employees’ wages and other associated costs, such as
mandated benefits, equal their marginal revenue product of labor.
Because higher compensation packages (wages plus benefits) are due to
the mandated benefits at any given employment rate, no movement
along the demand curve takes place. Instead, the demand curve itself
shifts down to the left; D’ is the new demand curve. The vertical distance
between curves D and D’ is the mandated benefit’s cost to the employer.
Employees usually place some value on the benefit that they are
mandated to receive. They will be willing to accept less in wages as
long as the value they place on their total compensation package (wages
plus benefits) does not decrease. Because this holds true for employees
at any given employment rate, no movement along the supply curve
takes place. Instead, the supply curve itself shifts down to the right; S’ is
the new supply curve. The vertical distance between curves S and S’ is
the mandated benefit’s value as assessed by the employees.
The value that employees put on the benefit can be greater than, equal
to, or smaller than the benefit’s cost to the employer. If the value equals
the cost, there are no real wage or employment effects. This is the situation
depicted by Figure 2. The employees receive a different combination of
compensation package, which has an equivalent value. Employees
appreciate the benefits their employers are mandated to supply and are
indifferent to whether they receive the benefits or cash wages in an
amount representing the value they place on the benefits. This, of
course, is a reasonable assumption, as it follows from the meaning of
“value.” Saying that employees place a certain value on the benefits
they receive means that they are willing to pay this specific amount to
purchase them and that giving up a cash wage is equivalent to paying
cash.28 Employers bear the same labor costs as they did prior to the
enactment of the mandated benefits, and because employment level is a
function of the wage rate, employment remains constant. It is as if nothing
has happened.

28. This statement ignores any possible psychological differences, such as the
endowment effect (also known as the framing effect), according to which people tend to
place higher values on things that they own relative to what they would have been
willing to pay for the same things if they did not own them. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman
et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1326–28 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979). These differences
do not change the analysis here because to the extent the differences affect employees
(i.e., employees find it difficult to give up some of their cash wage) they will simply be
reflected in lower values that employees place on the benefits, compared to the value the
employees otherwise would have placed on them.
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A. Value Is Lower than Cost
FIGURE 3

Wage
Rate

S
S’
a

W
W’
b
D
D’
E’

E

Worker-Hours

Figure 3 is similar to the figure that Summers used to present his
model.29 The figure depicts a mandated benefit that has a greater cost to
employers than value to employees. This can be seen by the difference
in vertical distances between the demand curves and supply curves. The
employees are willing to cut their wages by a small amount because of
the value they place on the mandated benefits, but the employers are
demanding a greater cut in wages, reflecting their greater cost incurred
in supplying the benefits. This leads to changes in wage and employment
rates. Point b, at which the S’ and D’ curves intersect, is the new market
clearing wage. At this point, the wage is W’ and the number of workerhours provided is E’.

29.

See Summers, supra note 4, at 180.
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The net cost of the mandated benefit is the difference between the
value that the employees place on the benefit and the cost to the
employers of providing the benefit. This causes a decline in the wage
rate from W to W’ and a decrease in employment level from E to E’.
A simple way to understand and demonstrate the effect the mandated
benefit has on the wage rate and employment level in such a case is to
net the movements of the curves. Both curves shifted down, but the
demand curve shifted down farther. We can therefore draw a figure,
such as Figure 4, that illustrates only the relevant change—the net cost
of the mandated benefit.
FIGURE 4

Wage
Rate
S
a
W
W’
b
D
D’
E’

E

Worker-Hours

Assume, for example, that a preexisting compensation package is
comprised of $20 per hour and that a mandated benefit, which costs the
employer $3 per hour per employee and is valued by each employee at
$1 per hour, is enacted. The supply curve would shift down by $1, and
the demand curve would shift down by $3. The result is a net shift down
of the demand curve by $2. Because the employees value the benefit
that the employer is mandated to provide to them at $1, the employer has
to pay them $19 in cash in order to maintain the same wage rate that
prevailed prior to the enactment of the mandated benefit. But the cost to
the employer is now $22 because it costs the employer $3 to provide the
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benefit. Therefore, the employer demands fewer worker-hours. Because
this is true for every point on the demand curve, there is no movement
along the demand curve. Instead, the demand curve itself shifts downward
by $2. The equilibrium point is now at the intersection of the supply
curve and the new demand curve, which is lower. Thus, the employees
bear part of the net cost of the mandated benefit (the difference between
the value to employees and the cost to employers) in the form of lower
wages and lower employment levels.
B. How Is the Burden Being Shared Between
Employers and Employees?
When the labor supply is relatively inelastic, the wage rate decreases
by the full cost of the mandate, even though the value the employees
place on the mandate is lower than the cost to the employer. In this
“inelastic supply case,” only employees bear the burden. To the degree
that employees’ wages do not fall, the employment level will—“the elastic
supply case.” This makes employers worse off as well; the greater cost
of labor forces them to decrease their demand for labor and they have to
decrease their output. Prior to the enactment of the mandated benefit,
they made a profit on that additional output. Hence, the decrease in
output reduces their profit.
However, employees as a group are not necessarily better off than
they were in the inelastic supply case, in which wages fell by the full
cost of the mandate, because some employees lost their jobs. Those
employees who kept their jobs are better off in the elastic supply case
compared to the inelastic supply case, in which all employees’ wages
decreased by the full cost. For the employees who lost their jobs, the loss of
welfare may be greater than the aggregate decrease in loss experienced by
the employees who maintained their jobs. Thus, the overall welfare loss
in the elastic supply case may be equal, smaller, or larger than the
welfare loss in the inelastic supply case.
Assume, as in the example above, that the wage rate is $20 per hour
and that a mandated benefit is enacted. The mandated benefit has a
value of $1 per hour to each employee and a cost of $3 per hour per
worker to the employer. In the inelastic supply case, the employees bear
the full cost of the mandate. Therefore, the wage rate decreases to $17
per hour, and the value of the compensation package after the mandate is
enacted is only $18 per hour. Under the elastic supply case, the wage
rate only decreases to $18, and the value of the compensation package
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after the mandate is $19 per hour. Because the labor cost has increased,
labor demand has declined. Assuming that half of the employees are
laid off, it is not clear which case produces a greater welfare for the
employees as a group: (1) the inelastic supply case, in which only the
employees bear the burden and all of them share equally in it, or (2) the
elastic supply case, in which the employer and the employees share in
the burden, but some employees lose their jobs and the rest of the
employees bear a smaller burden compared to their share of the burden
in the inelastic supply case.
The degree to which wage rates will decrease depends on the relative
elasticities of supply and demand for labor. Elasticity is the percentage
change in employment induced by a one percent increase in the wage
rate. As mentioned above, the demand curve slopes downward. Therefore,
an increase in the wage rate will cause employment to decrease. If a one
percent increase in the wage rate causes a one percent decrease in
demand for labor, the wage elasticity of demand is said to be unitary. If
the change in employment level is greater than one percent, the demand
curve is considered to be relatively elastic; if the change is less than one
percent, the demand curve is said to be relatively inelastic. The flatter
the demand curve, the more elastic it is.30
On the supply side, things may be a little more complicated because the
curve does not necessarily slope upward.31 When it slopes upward, indicating
that as wages rise, employees and potential employees are willing to
offer more worker-hours, elasticity can be defined as follows: If a one
percent increase in the wage rate causes a one percent increase in supply
of labor, the wage elasticity of supply is said to be unitary. If the change
in employment level is greater than one percent, the supply curve is
considered to be relatively elastic; if the change is less than one percent,
the supply curve is said to be relatively inelastic. The flatter the supply
curve, the more elastic it is.
If the labor market supply curve were perfectly inelastic—vertical—the
entire cost ($2 in our example) would be shifted to the employees in the
form of lower wages. The employment level would not change. This is
depicted by Figure 5.

30. Elasticity changes along the curve when the curve is drawn as a straight line. As it
goes down, it becomes less elastic. In the section of the curve where wages are high and labor
demanded is low, a one percent decrease in the wage rate would increase the employment level
by a relatively large percentage. At a point further down the curve, a one percent decrease in the
wage rate would increase employment by a smaller percentage because the same increase in the
number of labor units would represent a smaller percentage of total employment, compared to
the part of the curve that represents high wage rates and little employment.
31. It slopes backward when the income effect dominates the substitution effect. See
discussion supra note 19.
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FIGURE 5
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If, on the other hand, the labor supply curve were perfectly
elastic—horizontal—wages would not fall at all, but employment would.
This is depicted by Figure 6.
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FIGURE 6
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The elasticity of the demand curve has mirror effects. If the demand
curve were inelastic—vertical—there would be a large change in the
wage rate but a small change in the employment level. And if the
demand curve were elastic—horizontal—there would be a small change
in the wage rate but a large change in the employment level.
The outcome is determined by the relative elasticities of the supply
and demand curves for labor. It can also be more simply described by
comparing the slopes of the supply and demand curves.32 As mentioned
above, most labor economists maintain that the labor supply is relatively
inelastic. Therefore, most of the cost of a mandated benefit is borne by
employees in the form of a reduced wage rate without a substantial
employment decrease.
C. Value Is Greater than Cost
When employees place a value on a benefit that is greater than the
employer’s cost of providing the benefit, there is a net gain. Assume, for
example, that a preexisting compensation package is comprised of $20
per hour and the enactment of a mandated benefit that is valued by each
employee at $3 per hour and costs the employer only $1 per hour per
32. Philip E. Graves et al., Slope Versus Elasticity and the Burden of Taxation, 27
J. ECON. EDUC. 229, 232 (1996).
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employee. The supply curve would shift down by $3, and the demand
curve would shift down by $1. The result is a net shift down of the
supply curve by $2. The new equilibrium point, depicted by Figure 7, is
at a higher employment level.
FIGURE 7
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If the supply curve indeed shifts down by the full value that the
employees place on the benefits, employees do not share in the surplus
by way of receiving a higher compensation package.33 Their wages
decrease by the full value of the benefit, not only by the cost to the
employer of providing the benefit. Because demand for worker-hours
increases, employees gain as a group. Overall, employees’ welfare surplus
increases, but the compensation packages of individual employees do not.

33. A general equilibrium analysis would show that, in the long run, wages may
rise due to shortages in the labor supply and relative decreases in the cost of labor
compared to capital—the substitution effect.
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III. WHAT DOES THE TERM “EFFICIENCY” MEAN IN THE CONTEXT
OF MANDATED BENEFITS?
A. When the Employment Level Does Not Decrease
Economists often view only those mandated benefits that result in
lower employment levels as inefficient.34 This Part will try to see the
limits of this level-of-employment test as a guide for efficiency.
The test clearly does not apply to a decrease in the wage rate that is
greater than the value that existing employees place on the benefit; in
other words, the decrease is an outcome of the relative inelasticity of
labor supply. The mandated benefit is as inefficient as a mandated
benefit that results in unemployment. Employees’ welfare is reduced by
the mandate, and no one else in society benefits from it.35
Using the previous example to demonstrate the argument, assume the
existence of a mandated benefit that costs the employer $3 and is valued
by the employees at only $1. The labor supply curve should go down by
$1 and the labor demand curve should go down by $3. There should be
a net downward shift of the demand curve by $2. If one assumes a
perfectly inelastic labor supply, the employment level does not change at
all. This may look like the outcome of an efficient mandated benefit. In
other words, it may look like a mandated benefit that costs the employer
$2 and is valued by the employees at $2. But the employees value the
mandated benefit by $2 less than its cost. Therefore, relying on the
change in employment level as a means of assessing the efficiency of
mandated benefits is not accurate when the employment level decreases.

34. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 13, at 322. The last two sentences of Krueger’s
article are the following:
Nevertheless, my calculations of the employment and wage effects of an
employment-based health care mandate indicate that the employment loss
caused by the mandate would not be great, mainly because workers’ labor
supply decisions are relatively insensitive to wages. If this is correct, then an
employment-based health insurance mandate may not be much more
inefficient than other, probably less politically feasible, policies.
Id. Presumably the “other” policies are tax-financed programs. The inefficiencies they
cause are identical to the inefficiencies caused by mandated benefits. Assuming an
elastic labor supply, tax-financed programs with a tax component greater than the value
employees place on the benefits will result in lower employment levels as well. See
discussion infra Part IV.
35. That is the opposite of a Pareto improvement. A Pareto improvement, named
after the nineteenth century economist Vilfredo Pareto, is defined as a reallocation of
resources that makes at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off.
See ROSEN, supra note 15, at 41. Therefore, a reallocation that makes employees worse
off without making anyone else better off is inefficient by definition.
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B. Distinguishing Between “Narrow” and “Broad”
Definitions of “Efficiency”
When the value that employees place on the benefit is greater than the
cost to employers of providing the benefit, the outcome is efficient. In a
well functioning labor market, however, such a situation is impossible,
and mandated benefits can only reduce efficiency. If employers and
employees could freely negotiate the terms of the employment contract,
they would choose the compensation packages that best suit them.36 The
costs of providing specific benefits differ across employers, and
employees differ in tastes. This allows for a sorting process to extract
maximum utility for employees and profit for employers.37
For example, a risk averse employee may prefer a stable job offered
by an employer that puts a high value on firm-specific human capital,
and in return the employee would settle for a lower wage that would
enable the employer to invest in the employee’s training.38 Mandated
benefits restrict employers’ and employees’ freedom of contract and
prevent the extraction of gains from the sorting process.39 Therefore, in
a well functioning market, any mandated benefit would involve greater
cost to employers than value to employees because the benefit would
otherwise have been provided voluntarily.
In reality, the labor market has all kinds of inefficiencies. When a
mandated benefit has a net value, there must have been a market
inefficiency that prevented employers and employees from voluntarily
reaching this welfare enhancing result, and the mandate subsequently
overcame this market inefficiency. The result is efficient because the
total welfare is greater. Employers and employees are better off because
36. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 363 (5th ed. 1998);
Krueger, supra note 13, at 298.
37. According to the standard economic assumption, employees are assumed to
attempt to maximize their utility, while employers are assumed to attempt to maximize
their profit—or, in the case of not-for-profit employers, some measure of services
rendered, net of costs. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 20, at 63. There are
exceptions to this rule, such as where an employer has a taste for discrimination.
38. See generally GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (2d ed. 1975) (being the first to
formalize the distinction between general and job-specific human capital); Michael L.
Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29 INDUS.
REL. 240 (1990) (explaining that specific human capital is one of the most important
factors that create internal labor markets).
39. Krueger, supra note 13, at 305–06.

665

MARGOLIATH.DOC

1/14/2020 4:18 PM

they share in the surplus generated by adding a benefit to the
compensation package that has greater value than cost, while no one in
society is made worse off. This outcome satisfies the most basic and
least demanding definition of efficiency, known as Pareto efficiency.40
But even when the value that employees place on the benefit is
smaller than the cost to employers of providing the benefit, the outcome
may be efficient. This depends on the specific market inefficiency that the
mandated benefit was enacted to cure. For example, mandating employers
to provide health care insurance to their workers, at a cost that is greater
than the value that employees place on it, may still be efficient if the size
of the positive externality to society is greater than the net cost borne by
employers and employees. The following are a few examples that illustrate
the need to analyze the efficiency of mandated benefits according to the
underlying market inefficiencies that led to the enactment of the benefits.
1. Free Riding on Collective Goods
Collective goods are benefits that, by their nature, must be supplied to
a group of employees if they are supplied to one employee. The cost of
preventing employees from enjoying benefits they did not pay for is
higher than the amount an employee is required to pay for the benefits.
Hence, these benefits are nonexcludable. Health and safety terms often
have such nonexcludable nature.
For example, preventing employees who did not share in financing a
new air-cleaning machine from deriving benefit from the new
technology is much too expensive to be realistic. Therefore, if each
individual employee is rational, each has an incentive to conceal her true
preference for the collective good and pretend as if she is placing a
lower value on the good than its real value to her. By doing so, the
employee is trying to make the other employees finance part of her share
in the cost of the benefit.
When many employees act in this way, efficient benefits—benefits
that employees truly value more than they cost—are not purchased at all.
Employees conceal the real value that they place on the benefits, and the
employer does not provide the benefit because it believes that the
benefit’s value is lower than its cost. The employer would have offered
40. If one relaxes the assumption that all employees have identical preferences, it
becomes possible that some employees will put a low value on the benefit and will
therefore be made worse off. The mandated benefit may still be considered efficient, not
according to the Pareto rule, but according to the Kaldor-Hicks rule, as long as those
who gain from the mandated benefit gain enough so that they could compensate those
who lose, without requiring that such compensation actually be paid. See POSNER, supra
note 36, at 12–17.
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the benefit in return for a wage reduction had it known the true value
that employees place on the benefit.41
This free riding problem also exists with public goods supplied by the
government.42 Residents and citizens have an incentive to understate the
true values they place on the benefits because everyone is supposed to
share the financing of the goods according to the value that each
individual places on them. The government solves the problem of free
riding in public goods by financing them through taxes.43 This may be
an option in the employment context as well. But when the employer
supplies the benefits, government intervention takes the form of
mandated benefits. Policymakers estimate the aggregate value that
employees truly place on the benefits and coerce employees into
purchasing the benefits by mandating employers to provide them.44
Mandated benefits that are designed to overcome the inefficiency
caused by free riding behavior are efficient even under the narrow
definition of efficiency. The benefits provided because of such mandates
are meant to have greater value to employees than cost to employers. Of
course, there are individual employees who place a lower value on the
benefits than the cost of providing the benefits to them. But the
mandated benefits should still be considered efficient according to the
narrow definition, as long as the efficiencies they created for some
employees outweigh the inefficiencies created for other employees. This
type of efficiency is known as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.45
2. Imperfect Information
The employment contract is unique because it may endure for a very
long term, possibly throughout the employee’s entire life. Moreover, the
employee usually offers general efforts, not particular outcomes or
specific projects. This makes the contract incomplete, as employers and
employees lack information that is relevant to many issues that are most
likely to arise during the course of their relationship.46 Devising ex-ante
41. For a classic example of this matter, see Steven L. Willborn, Individual
Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67
NEB. L. REV. 101, 120–27 (1988).
42. See ROSEN, supra note 15, at 63.
43. Id. at 64.
44. See Krueger, supra note 13, at 297.
45. See discussion supra note 40.
46. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Workmen’s Compensation and Occupational Safety Under
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 80, 80 (1981); Gregory K. Dow, The New

667

MARGOLIATH.DOC

1/14/2020 4:18 PM

procedures and terms that will help solve some of these issues is costly,
and the parties usually do not write comprehensive ex-ante covenants.47
Moreover, changes in the law, whether by legislation or court decisions,
affect the employment contract in a manner that is usually too
comprehensive and complex to be negotiated anew for each employment
situation. Accordingly, because they have imperfect information, employees
usually do not bargain for particular benefits that they should objectively
desire.48
In addition to the difficulties associated with obtaining such information,
employees may suffer from systematic misinformation provided by
employers regarding certain facts, such as the risks involved in the job
and psychological barriers.49 Employees may, for instance, underestimate
the benefit of purchasing—by way of accepting a wage reduction—a
new safety device because they have difficulties admitting how risky
their jobs really are or admitting that they made mistakes taking the jobs
in the first place.50 Empirical studies have found that individuals often
act irrationally, systematically misjudging probabilities and insuring
themselves inadequately.51 For example, they tend to overinsure against
predictable, small losses and underinsure against unpredictable, catastrophic
losses.52
The issue of irrationality is related to another reason behind government
intervention—paternalism. Society may believe that individuals value
certain services too little. For example, employees generally tend to
underestimate the importance of pension savings or merit goods, such as
education or health insurance.53
Institutional Economics and Employment Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF
57, 57–59 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
47. Dow, supra note 46, at 57–59.
48. For example, employees mistakenly tend to believe that the law provides them
much greater protection against discharges than in fact it does. Therefore, they fail to
contract for efficient “for cause” provisions in return for part of their wages or other
benefits. See Willborn, supra note 41, at 128.
49. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 28, at 274–87 (finding that individuals
systematically err by preferring outcomes that are obtained with certainty to equally
preferred outcomes that are merely probable); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–79 (1998). See generally
Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
287, 287 (1996) (“A person who prefers chicken over pasta should not change this
preference on learning that fish is also available.”); Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson,
Context-Dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1179 (1993) (noting that people’s
choices are irrationally affected by the order in which the options are presented to them).
50. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & STEWART J. SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 207 (2000).
51. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
52. ESTREICHER & SCHWAB, supra note 50, at 206.
53. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 13–14 (defining merit wants as public wants
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
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When parties lack information and the government intervention
reveals the information, such as in the case of provisions of the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)54 that
impose disclosure requirements regarding pension plans on employers,
the outcome will be efficient under the narrow definition of efficiency.
Usually, however, the government intervention does not require that
employers reveal information; it simply forces the parties to add terms to
the employment contracts that they failed to negotiate due to the lack of
information. Because the parties remain ignorant after the government
intervention, the values they place on the mandated benefits are too low.
This means that the mandated benefits are inefficient under the narrow
definition of efficiency. However, assuming that the government accurately
assessed the situation, the mandated benefits are still efficient under the
broad definition of efficiency.
3. Externalities
An externality is the effect of one entity on the welfare of another in a
way that is not transmitted by market prices.55 Externalities can be
positive or negative.56 When an externality is negative, such as factory
pollution, government intervention may be helpful because transaction
costs or a lack of defined property rights may bar the parties from
reaching an efficient contract—the Coase Theorem.57 An example of
helpful government intervention in this case would be the government’s
making the polluting factory bear the costs of pollution.
In the context of the employment contract, for example, layoffs at one
firm may raise unemployment insurance taxes—premiums—at other
firms. This would justify government intervention in the form of
mandatory plant closing notification.58 Externalities can be positive, and
government intervention may be required to guarantee a high level of
such a beneficial activity.59 A good example of such a positive
considered “so meritorious that their satisfaction is provided for through the public
budget, over and above what is provided for through the market and paid for by private
buyers” and stating that “situations may arise, within the context of a democratic
community, where an informed group is justified in imposing its decision upon others”).
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2002).
55. ROSEN, supra note 15, at 79–81.
56. Id.
57. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
58. See Summers, supra note 4, at 178.
59. ROSEN, supra note 15, at 100.
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externality is employer provided health care. Society is unwilling to
deny health care benefits to poor, uninsured individuals when they
become seriously ill. The mandated benefit therefore creates a positive,
altruistic externality.60
Mandated benefits that were enacted to overcome externalities,
whether negative or positive, are never efficient under the narrow
definition of efficiency. These mandated benefits confer benefits on
third parties; therefore, their value to employees is lower than the cost to
employers to supply them. They are efficient according to the broad
definition of efficiency only because the welfare of third parties is taken
into account.
4. Adverse Selection
Private markets for certain kinds of insurance may fail to emerge
because of information asymmetry.61 Employers offering certain
insurance pitched for the average person will attract a disproportionate
share of employees that are likely to overuse such a policy. Summers
gives the example of an employer offering health insurance to
employees, financing the insurance premium with a salary reduction
equal to the average cost of insurance.62 Employees who expect to
underutilize the benefit will tend to go elsewhere, while employees who
expect to use the benefit extensively will be attracted to that workplace.
This will raise the costs to the firm of providing the benefit and require
the firm to further lower the monetary wages. This will cause moderate
users to drop out, which will raise the cost still higher. This may
ultimately result in the benefit not being offered at all, even if the
average and total cost of providing the benefit is lower than the average
and total utility that employees would derive from that benefit.
Asymmetric information between employers and employees regarding
the safety of the workplace, the likelihood of taking parental leave, and
60. See Summers, supra note 4, at 178; see also Marianne A. Ferber, Commentary
on Chapter 5, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 162, 162 (Francine D.
Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997).
Parental leaves are useful because according to most experts in the field,
children will do better when cared for in their own home at least for some
months after they are born. This in turn is good for employers and for society
in the long run, because children who get a better start are more likely to grow
up to be productive workers and good citizens.
Id.
61. For more on information asymmetry, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970);
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976).
62. See Summers, supra note 4, at 178–79.
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so forth, may cause similar problems. Mandated benefits are applied to
all of the employers; therefore, the bad risks do not flock to the one firm
that offers them. If the benefit is desirable from a policy perspective,
then the mandated benefit will have a positive outcome.63
Mandated benefits that were enacted to overcome adverse selection
inefficiency may be valued by the employees at or above their cost and
may therefore be efficient according to the narrow definition of
efficiency. They may not be efficient for a particular employee who
places a low value on the benefits or for a particular employer if the
benefits are relatively more costly for it to provide, but the mandated
benefit may be efficient overall.
5. Transaction Costs
As mentioned above, the employment contract is a unique type of
contract that is bound to be incomplete.64 At the time it is negotiated,
the parties cannot anticipate all future contingencies and enforcement
may require extensive monitoring. In addition, employees may feel
uncomfortable asking for certain benefits, such as sick leave or
severance pay, for fear of making bad impressions on their employers.
Employees will usually value a mandated benefit that overcomes this
type of market inefficiency, and its efficiency can therefore be evaluated
under the narrow definition of efficiency.
C. Implementing the Accurate Definition of “Efficiency”
in the Context of Mandated Benefits
This Article’s first point deals with a “narrow” definition of
efficiency; the second point deals with a “broad” definition of efficiency.
According to the narrow definition of efficiency, which is consistent
with Pareto efficiency, a mandated benefit is efficient as long as
employees place a value on it that is higher than its cost of provision to
employers. As previously mentioned, this is a direct implementation of
the Pareto principle.
The broad definition of efficiency is more complicated. It applies to
cases in which the value that employees place on the benefit is lower
than the cost that employers incur in providing the benefit. Such cases
63.
64.

Krueger, supra note 13, at 300.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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are inefficient according to the narrow definition of efficiency. But the
narrow definition of efficiency may, in fact, be circular. It assumes that
the value that employees place on the benefits is accurate because it is
the outcome of the free market. In the free market, prices are usually
relied on as a means of directing resources to their highest valuable uses.
But, in the context of mandated benefits, one ought to remember that the
reason the benefits were enacted in the first place was the existence of
certain market failures. In such cases, how can the value and price
mechanism be relied on to lead to an efficient result if the baseline
assumption is one of market failure?65
IV. MANDATED BENEFITS VERSUS TAX-FINANCED PROGRAMS
There are four different means by which the government can intervene
in the provision of goods to workers. The first option is a general
resources financed program. The government can allocate a portion of
the national budget toward financing and providing benefits to all
citizens or to working residents. If one focuses on the marginal increase
in public spending, then this option is actually a tax-financed program
because all previous resources have already been allocated. The tax that
is used to finance the program can be any kind of tax; for example, it
could take the form of a proportionate increase in all existing taxes. The
second option is a limited case of the first option: financing the benefits
by a payroll tax.66 Under this option, employees pay the government for
the benefits they receive. The government’s third option is to induce
employers to offer, and employees to accept, certain benefits by way of
allowing a tax or other kind of subsidy.67 The fourth option is
mandating employers to provide certain benefits to their employees.
It is most likely that when Summers compared mandated benefits and
tax-financed programs, he was referring to payroll or income taxes; in
his examples, it is assumed that all employers and employees paid the
tax that financed the benefits. Likewise, this Part compares a benefit
program financed by a tax on labor income with a mandated benefits
program. The general theory is applicable to the other options as well.68
65. For a similar criticism of the new institutional economics, see Dow, supra note
46, at 60.
66. An example would be Social Security.
67. For a discussion of the equivalence of a tax subsidy and a direct grant, see
STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES
(1983); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1973).
68. See MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION
AND TAXATION 125 (1999) (noting that from a constitutional point of view, as courts
have interpreted it, there is no distinction between mandated benefits—regulation—and
tax-financed programs).
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A. Excess Burden (Deadweight Loss)
1. What Is Excess Burden?69
Summers claimed that tax-financed programs usually entail greater
excess burden than mandated benefits.70 In the context of taxes,
inefficiency is usually referred to as excess burden or deadweight loss.71
It is a loss of welfare above and beyond the tax revenues collected.72 In
other words, it is a net welfare loss. It is caused by reducing the welfare
of taxpayers by taxing them without generating revenue that could be
used to enhance welfare through government actions, such as provision
of public goods or redistribution, if justified under society’s social
welfare function.73
A significant part of the inefficiency cost of taxation is attributable to
administrative costs such as compliance and enforcement.74 Moreover,
some inefficiency is caused by tax avoidance activity because taxpayers
engage in transactions that are not optimal from a business perspective
and therefore do not generate the highest possible yield. Instead, the
taxpayers reduce the taxes that they are required to pay, increasing their
after-tax income.75 This is a cost to society because the production
factors are not optimally used to produce the maximum yield. But the
69. Readers who are familiar with the concept of excess burden are advised to skip
to Part IV.A.2.
70. See Summers, supra note 4, at 179–81.
71. See ROSEN, supra note 15, at 282–305; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 522–26 (3d ed. 2000); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and
Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1650–56 (1999).
72. See ROSEN, supra note 15, at 283.
73. For example, utilitarians require redistribution from wealthy to poor individuals.
Under standard assumptions that all individuals have similar utility functions and that
income, like all other normal goods, has a declining marginal utility, then subject to
efficiency limitations, such redistribution will increase the aggregate utility—maximizing the
utilitarian social welfare function. See generally Francis Bator, The Simple Analytics of
Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (1957).
74. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 130–33 (1996).
75. This may include the substitution of untaxed fringe benefits and more pleasant
working conditions for taxable income; a shift in portfolios to tax-deferred forms, such
as IRAs and section 401(k) pension plans; a migration of businesses from corporate to
pass-through entities or vice versa, depending on the difference between individual and
corporate income tax rates; and the purchase of owner-occupied housing, home office
equipment, and other otherwise unnecessarily preferred expenses, as long as they can be
deducted from taxable income and are valued at least at (1-t)—t being the individual’s
marginal tax rate.
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term excess burden is often used to describe one specific cost of
taxation—the effect that taxes have on relative prices.76 In the context of
this Article, the term refers to the effect that taxes have on the
motivation to work.
A wage tax, such as an income tax or a payroll tax, affects the relative
price of leisure.77 The cost of leisure is its opportunity cost, namely, the
wage that could have been earned if not for the consumption of leisure.
The tax lowers wages and thus makes leisure relatively cheaper.
Therefore, people tend to consume more of it and work less. This is
commonly referred to as the “substitution effect.”78 There is an
offsetting effect that is due to the loss of income incurred by the tax.
People may want to work more in order to maintain their former aftertax income. This is commonly referred to as the “income effect.”79
Only the change in relative prices—the substitution effect—is causing
the excess burden. This change introduces a tax wedge between what
the employers pay and what the employees receive.80 The employer
pays a before-tax wage of w, but the employee bases her decision
regarding whether to work on her after-tax wage, which is (1 – t)w, t
being her marginal tax rate.
Efficiency requires that the rate at which work transforms leisure into
other consumption goods (the marginal rate of transformation, which is
actually the incremental production cost of one more unit of output)
equal the rate at which employees substitute work for leisure (the
marginal rate of substitution).81 The tax fractures this equality because
the marginal rate of substitution is based on the after-tax wage, while the
marginal rate of transformation is based on the before-tax wage.82 Even
if employees do not change their labor supply as a result of the tax—a
phenomenon that will occur if the income effect offsets the substitution
effect—the tax will involve excess burden.
This outcome can be proved by hypothetically replacing the wage tax
with a lump sum tax that generates the same amount of revenue. A lump
sum tax is a certain amount, such as a head tax of an exact dollar
amount, that must be paid regardless of the taxpayer’s behavior. It is
considered a hypothetical tax because its highly regressive nature makes
it politically unfeasible—unless it is tied to characteristics of ability
76. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 15, at 283–97.
77. Other taxes, such as income taxation of interest, dividends, and capital gains or
estate and gift taxation, may affect savings.
78. See ROSEN, supra note 15, at 283–97.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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other than income—but it is often used as a benchmark for efficiency
analysis.83 Lump sum taxation is unique in that it causes an income effect,
but, because it does not change relative prices, no substitution effect.84
In the context of this discussion, the lump sum tax does not change the
relative cost of leisure because it is not imposed on wages. Individuals
must pay it whether they work or not. Such a tax will raise the same
amount of revenue while maintaining the taxpayers on a higher utility
level than where a wage tax places them, even if the wage tax does not
cause a change in the labor supply, as the income and substitution effects
offset each other. Hence, comparing the wage tax with this benchmark
of a nondistorting tax proves the inefficiency of the wage tax even when
there is no change in the labor supply.85
2. Tax-Financed Programs and Mandated Benefits Entail the
Same Type of Excess Burden
The conventional definition of excess burden in the taxation context
assumes that the tax is a net loss to the taxpayer who pays it.86 The taxes
are not offset by the benefits that the taxpayer receives from the
government—benefits that were financed by the tax revenue. This is
accurate because the government uses the revenue to finance
nonexcludable benefits. In other words, the tax has a substitution
effect—leisure becomes less expensive—even when the government
uses the revenue to the benefit of the taxpayer because the taxpayer
receives government provided goods and services whether or not he pays
the tax. The government uses the revenue to finance public goods, such
as national defense, the court system, and infrastructures, from which
every resident can benefit. Public goods are nonexcludable. Other
publicly provided goods, such as education, could be excluded, but they
are considered to be merit goods—goods that the government would like
every resident or citizen to have.87 Therefore, the tax that individuals
pay is viewed as a net loss from each individual’s personal perspective.

83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
For an explanation of this result, see ROSEN, supra note 15, at 289–90;
STIGLITZ, supra note 71, at 536. To fully comprehend the thesis presented in this
Article, a general understanding of the term “excess burden” will suffice.
86. ROSEN, supra note 15, at 283–97.
87. See supra note 53.
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In contrast, the tax element in tax-financed programs must be offset
against the very benefits that the tax finances because only taxpayers are
entitled to the benefits. A payroll tax therefore finances benefits that are
paid only to employees. In reality, a payroll tax often finances benefits
that accrue to nonemployees. In such a case, the payroll tax should be
replaced with a general income tax to more equally spread the burden of
financing the benefits on all the taxpayers—specifically, on those who
are self employed, if they are not covered by the payroll tax—and on
income from capital such as interest, dividends, royalties, rents, and
capital gains.
In the example provided here, one would assume that the benefits are
confined to employees; therefore, a tax-financed program and a
mandated benefit would be the relevant alternatives. When employees
pay the payroll tax, their welfare is reduced by the tax but is increased
by the benefits they receive from the government that are financed by
the revenue generated from the tax. Therefore, when measuring the
excess burden of taxes that are part of a tax-financed program—taxes
that finance excludable benefits—only the net tax generates excess
burden. The net tax is the tax minus the value of benefits provided by
the government to the taxpayer in lieu of the taxes the taxpayer paid,
assuming that the value of the benefits is lower than the taxes paid. This
is an exact analogy to mandated benefits. The tax is the equivalent of
the cost incurred by the employer in providing the benefit.
As demonstrated above, it does not matter whether the employer or
the employee formally bears the burden of paying the tax or providing
the benefit. If the cost of providing the benefit, or the tax that finances
the benefit, is greater than the value of the benefit, the net cost will be
borne by the parties according to the relative supply and demand for
labor. It will take the form of lower wages or employment level,
possibly both. If there is a net gain, the parties will split it accordingly.
If the cost and the value of the benefit are exactly the same, nothing will
happen. In the case of mandated benefits, wages will decrease, but the
value of the total compensation package (wages plus benefits) will
remain the same. In the case of a tax-financed program, the after-tax
value of the compensation package will remain the same: a smaller
monetary wage, but an additional benefit.
For example, assume that a mandated benefits program requires
employers to provide their employees with a benefit that has a value of
$100. According to Summers’s model, this results in a wage cut of $100
and has no effect on labor supply; therefore it is efficient.88 Likewise, a
tax-financed program that requires every employee to pay $100 in tax
88.
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and provides each employee with a benefit that has a value of $100 has no
effect on labor supply. The two tools of social policy are equally efficient.
All the parties involved—employees, employers, and consumers—are
indifferent as to whether the employees (1) receive a lower after-tax
wage due to having paid higher taxes in return for certain benefits
provided by the government or (2) receive the same lower after-tax wage
due to having given up some of their wages in return for similar benefits
provided by their employer. Therefore, there can be no fundamental
difference in efficiency between mandated benefits and tax-financed
programs. If the tax in this example had been calculated as a percentage
of the wage, as taxes often are, it would have involved benefits that may
have differed from costs. But this is not due to a fundamental difference
in the efficiency of mandated benefits and tax-financed programs; it is
due to a difference in the design of the particular tax.
Mandated benefits involve excess burden whenever the cost of
providing the benefit is greater than the value that employees place on
the benefit.89 When the objective value of the benefit is greater than its
subjective value—the value that employees place on it—it is not a
deadweight loss because the burden is not a waste. The government
uses the mandate to achieve a certain goal, such as the correction of
market inefficiency or paternalism.90
The government can also use the mandate to benefit individuals other
than the taxpayer.91 In such cases, the difference between the cost of the
benefit to the employers and the value that employees place on the
benefit is not an excess burden. It is equivalent to a tax that raises
revenue used either to provide merit goods or to overcome externalities.
It is a tax “in kind”—it generates revenue, but not in the form of money.
Only the part of the tax burden that does not benefit anyone in society is
considered excess burden. This part is equivalent to the difference
between the employer’s cost of providing the mandated benefit and the
benefit’s objective value to the individual employee in cases of
imperfect information, or to third parties in cases of externalities.
Mandated benefits involve a deadweight loss when the cost of
providing the benefit is greater than the value that employees place on
the benefit. Even if the wage rate is reduced by the full cost of providing
89. Id. at 180–81.
90. See discussion supra Part III.B.
91. An example of this occurs where uninsured individuals benefit from health
care financed by insured employees.
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the benefit—with no decrease in the employment level—there is still a
substitution effect. Leisure becomes less expensive because the value of
the compensation for work (wages plus benefits) decreases. As
previously mentioned, the mere fact that the labor supply has not
changed does not mean that there is no excess burden. The excess burden
is caused by the change in relative prices. When the cost of providing
the benefit is greater than the benefit’s value, there is a net decrease in
the value of the compensation package; therefore, there is a change in
relative prices. According to the theory of excess burden, such a change
is inefficient. This can be grasped intuitively because forcing employees
to purchase a benefit at a price higher than at which they value it reduces
their welfare, whether or not it decreases their labor supply.
Whenever policymakers intervene in the labor market to supply workers
with a tangible benefit, the benefit can be provided either in the form of
mandated benefit or as a tax-financed program. Parental leave is a
straightforward example. Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA), employers are required to permit their employees to take
up to twelve weeks a year of unpaid leave in the event that they, or an
immediate family member, have a “serious health condition” or in the
event that they have a newborn or newly adopted child.92 The employer
incurs costs in maintaining workers’ jobs and in continuing health insurance
premium payments on behalf of employees that are on family and
medical leave.93 Alternatively, one could think of a tax-financed
program under which employees pay a tax that funds the payments to the
health insurance company and to the employer to compensate for the
costs the employer incurs when employees take parental leave.94
Employers who voluntarily provided parental leave programs prior to
the enactment of the mandate (who therefore were not affected by the
program) would not only pay taxes due to the tax-financed program but
would receive benefits as well.95 These benefits, at least in theory,
92. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c). The employee can be required to repay his employer for
health insurance costs upon the employee’s failure to return to work after the leave. See
Jane Waldfogel, The Impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 281, 283 (1999) (estimating the cost at $250 per employee per year).
94. Virtually all industrialized countries mandate that employers provide jobprotected leave from work after the birth of a child. None of these governments
compensate employers for the costs they incur in securing jobs for employees during the
employees’ absences. Many countries, especially in Europe, provide the employee with
income support financed through payroll taxes during the leave period. See generally
Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates:
Lessons from Europe, 113 Q.J. ECON. 285 (1998).
95. Under such a scheme, the government would pay the employers for the costs
incurred in maintaining the employee’s job during the time of the leave. Such costs
include training a temporary replacement and possibly paying a higher wage (premium)
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should offset the taxes paid by the employers to finance the parental
leave program and should therefore result in no excess burden. The
benefits provided by the government to the employers in return for the
taxes serve three purposes. First, the benefits release the employers
from paying their employees during the leave period, if under a
mandated benefit program they were required to do so. Second, the
benefits release the employers from paying for the employees’ health
insurance. Lastly, the benefits serve as compensation for the costs of
securing jobs during the employees’ absences from work.
B. Tax-Financed Programs Cause a “Government Provision Trap”96
Summers also argues that tax-financed programs may induce
employers to not provide their employees with benefits of higher quality,
which they would have offered in the absence of such tax-financed
programs.97 This is not a fundamental fault of tax-financed programs,
but merely a problem with their current prevalent design.
Using a voucher as a part of the tax-financed program could eliminate
the problem. A voucher is a capped or restricted subsidy that provides
the recipient some freedom to choose how to spend the aid on limited
types of goods or services.98 Broadly defined, a voucher may be paid
out in cash, paid in kind, or provided indirectly as a tax subsidy.99
Using a voucher would solve the government provision trap.
Employers who supplied their employees with higher quality benefits
prior to the enactment of the tax-financed program would continue to do
so because the voucher would reimburse them for their costs up to the
voucher’s worth. Summers admits that public programs that partially
compensate those seeking high quality, private sector benefits could
avoid the government provision trap, but he dismisses the idea as
to the replacement employee to compensate the employee for the employer’s inability to
offer the replacement employee a long-term employment contract.
96. See Summers, supra note 4, at 179 (citing Sam Peltzman, The Effect of
Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of Higher Education,
81 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1973) (discussing such a “government provision trap” in the context
of higher education)).
97. Id. at 179–80.
98. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Common Issues for Voucher Programs, in VOUCHERS
AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 3, 4–5 (C. Eugene Steuerle et al. eds., 2000).
For an analysis of some basic economic issues presented by voucher-like programs, see
David F. Bradford & Daniel N. Shaviro, The Economics of Vouchers, in VOUCHERS AND
THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra, at 40.
99. Steuerle, supra note 98, at 4–5.
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politically infeasible.100 He may be correct, but when comparing taxfinanced programs to mandated benefits, the point should be restated as
a political economy argument rather than as one based on efficiency.
The government provision trap is not a necessary result of taxfinanced programs. It is the product of a faulty design that is based on a
fiscal illusion.101 It should not count as a fundamental difference
between mandated benefits and tax-financed programs. Mandated
benefits may be politically popular because they emphasize the benefits
while hiding their costs.102 They are definitely more popular than
explicit “taxes,” but these are not essential differences in efficiency
between mandated benefits and tax-financed programs.103 Moreover,
current mandated benefits programs also have many faults in design,
such as their usual imposition of fixed costs. These fixed costs
inefficiently and unjustly induce employment of full-time employees
over part-time workers.104 Such faults should be taken into account
when comparing mandated benefits and tax-financed programs.
C. Some Possible Efficiency Differences Between Mandated
Benefits and Tax-Financed Programs
This Article has thus far clarified the Summers argument: The
potential source of the excess burden of mandated benefits and taxfinanced programs is the difference in incidences of costs and benefits.
This Article has shown that, although excess burden is usually related to
taxes, both social policy tools can have similar incidence issues and
therefore entail similar types of excess burden. There are, however,
other efficiency arguments that might, in fact, separate mandated
benefits and tax-financed programs.
First, some of the inefficiencies and distortions caused by taxes are
not a result of the taxes’ redistribution function.105 Using a tax to
finance employment benefits may be less efficient than using a
100. See Summers, supra note 4, at 180 n.3.
101. Most people would not appreciate the efficiency and distributive advantages of
a system that refunds part of the expenses incurred by rich people who choose higher
quality services over “free” government services. People tend to concentrate on the
immediate benefit that the rich receive, while ignoring the overall progressive picture.
For a similar problem, see Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low Income
Households, 84 TAX NOTES 1191, 1192 (1999).
102. See Krueger, supra note 13, at 298.
103. The Social Security system uses similar tactics to hide its redistributive nature.
See DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 104 (2000).
104. See HAMERMESH, supra note 13, at 45–56.
105. See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 9, at 199 (“[O]utside of an optimum, there
is no necessary link between the distr[i]butional characteristics of a tax or public good
and the revenue leakage associated with it.”).
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mandated benefit because of administrative costs of the tax system.
These distortions caused by the tax system are in addition to the
inefficiency attributed to the redistributive function of the tax.
Mandated benefit programs may involve similar offsetting inefficiencies,
such as noncompliance, which require monitoring costs.106
Evasion and avoidance, two sources of inefficiency usually discussed
in the context of general taxes, are not relevant to tax-financed programs
because the benefits are provided as a function of paying the tax. These
inefficiencies are relevant to the extent that the tax-financed program has
a redistributive function. Redistribution will usually be achieved by
supplying a fixed benefit to all employees and imposing a tax that is
computed as a percentage of the wage—possibly even at a progressive
rate. In such a case, individuals may try to lower their taxed income and
enjoy the same level of benefit. This can be achieved in two ways. The
first is avoidance—either shifting compensation from taxed wages to
non-taxed fringe benefits and working conditions or claiming any
available deductions. The second is evasion—underreporting of income.
Mandated benefits do not share such problems because the tax is being
paid in the form of reduced wages.
Second, there are situations in which employers have some direct
control over their own behavior or the behavior of their employees. For
example, mandating employers to pay for work related injuries and
illnesses, which is currently done by workers’ compensation, might be
efficient. It induces employers to enhance workplace safety to reduce
expected payments to employees for work related injuries. Another
example is unemployment insurance, assuming it is experience rated.
The employer will keep layoffs at a minimum and share information
with employees about expected downsizing or plant closings, giving
them time to look for new jobs long before they are fired. In such
situations, mandated benefits provide employers with incentives that
would be complicated to achieve using a tax-financed program.
Third, the benefit is part of the work or the workplace itself. This
includes, for example, exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine107
106. See Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance with the Minimum
Wage Law, 87 J. POL. ECON. 333 (1979).
107. For the latest empirical findings, see David H. Autor et al., The Costs of
Wrongful Discharge Laws (Oct. 2, 2001) (unpublished working paper presented by John
Donohue at New York University’s Labor and Employment Law Center’s Workshop
(Oct. 16, 2001) (on file with author)).
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and antidiscrimination laws.108 If government intervention is needed to
supply a component of the work itself, a tax-financed program cannot
replace it. Work and the workplace environment provide more than just
an income stream.109
V. REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FROM EMPLOYERS TO EMPLOYEES
A. Under the Basic Framework, No Such Redistribution Is
Possible to Any of the Employees
Mandated benefits programs coerce employers to supply benefits to
their employees. As previously discussed, this does not mean that
employers are “footing the bill.” This is a matter of tax incidence,
usually discussed in connection with the question of who bears the
burden of payroll taxes. Summers’s basic model shows that employees
will pay for the benefits with either a reduced wage rate or a decreased
employment level.110
When the mandated benefits are of a fixed cost nature, such as a
requirement that employers provide elevators at the workplace, the costs
cannot be shifted to the employees who benefit from the mandate. For
example, employers cannot reduce the wages of disabled employees to
offset the cost incurred in building the elevators that enable the disabled
employees’ access to the workplace. This is due to the one-time nature
of such costs; they do not affect the marginal cost of employing the
disabled. Donohue gives a similar example, according to which the
costs of a mandate that requires employers to eliminate neutral practices
that unfairly impede certain group members receiving offers of
employment cannot be shifted to the targeted employees.111
Summers and Jolls focus only on mandates that impose costs that
increase with the number of hours of labor—per worker-hour costs.
This type of cost is also the focus of this Article. When the employer’s
cost of providing the mandated benefit is greater than the employees’
valuation of the benefit, the employer will first reduce the wages by an
amount equivalent to the employees’ valuation of the benefit. As
108. See Jolls, supra note 2, at 226 (explaining how antidiscrimination laws may in
some aspects be viewed as mandated benefits).
109. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 914 (noting that other scholars have “found that
the average worker is benefited in terms of perceived happiness when personal income
rises, but is far more adversely affected by being unemployed”); Amartya Sen, Inequality,
Unemployment and Contemporary Europe, 136 INT’L LAB. REV. 155, 156 (1997).
110. Summers, supra note 4, at 180.
111. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 905–06; see also Tyler Cowen & Alexander
Tabarrok, Good Grapes and Bad Lobsters: Applying the Alchian and Allen Theorem, 33
ECON. INQUIRY 253, 254 (1995).
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previously mentioned, this has no labor supply implication because the
value of the overall compensation package remains the same. The
employer will then seek to lower wages by the remaining cost. This is
the “tax” component of the mandated benefit,112 which employers and
employees will bear according to the relative elasticities of labor supply
and demand.
Even if the labor supply is more elastic than the labor demand,
meaning that employers will bear most of the tax burden, it does not
mean that those employees are better off as a result of the mandated
benefit. That is because the tax component has no incremental benefit
value to the employees.113 Whatever value the mandated benefit had,
assuming that employees correctly assessed it, was already taken from
them through a wage reduction.
Assuming that the labor supply is not perfectly inelastic, mandated
benefits that have greater cost to the employers than value to the
employees will produce a new equilibrium point to the southwest of the
initial equilibrium point.114 At this point, some employees will drop out
of the labor market.
The employees who lost their jobs are clearly worse off, but so are the
employees who maintained their jobs. Even though the new equilibrium
point is at a higher wage point than it would have been had employers
been able to reduce wages by the full cost of the mandated benefit, the
employees who stayed in the labor market did not enjoy a wage increase.
Their wages did not decrease by the full cost of providing the mandated
benefit, but because the tax component of the mandated benefit had no
value to them, they did not benefit from not having to fully pay for the
benefit. They fully paid, through reduced wages, for the valued benefit
part. It is only the tax component, which is worthless, that they did not
fully pay for. Because they did pay for some of the tax component of
the benefit, they too are worse off. This can be graphically demonstrated
by focusing on the “workers’ surplus.”
Workers’ surplus is the difference between the wage rate that workers
are willing to receive and a higher wage rate that they actually do receive.
112. When the cost to employers of providing the benefit is greater than the value
that employees place on the benefit, the difference is a net tax—or loss.
113. This is true unless we assume that the mandated benefits actually have a
greater value than the value that employees put on them, such as with merit goods or
pensions. See discussion infra Part V.B.
114. See supra fig.3, at Part II.A.
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If one assumes that the labor supply curve slopes upward—meaning that
workers offer more worker-hours as the wage rate increases—the wage
rate at the equilibrium point is what employees, as a group, require for
the marginal worker-hour. Even though they would be willing to provide,
at a lower rate, all the work hours before the marginal one, the
employees receive the marginal wage rate for all of the worker-hours
that they supply.
Similarly, employers enjoy an “employer’s surplus,” which is the
difference between the wage rate that they are willing to offer and the
wage rate that they actually pay. Assuming that the labor demand curve
slopes downward—meaning that less labor is demanded as the wage rate
increases—the wage rate that is set at the equilibrium point is the rate
that employers are willing to pay for the marginal worker-hour. Even
though they are willing to pay higher wage rates for previous workerhours, they pay this marginal wage rate for all the worker-hours that
they purchase.
FIGURE 8
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To illustrate, assume that there is only one employee, and that this
employee is willing to offer services for $10 per hour for the first
nineteen hours of work per week. The worker already requires $15 for
the twentieth hour and $30 for the fortieth hour. Assuming that the
demand for labor is such that the equilibrium point is set at forty hours a
week, the worker’s wage rate is $30 per hour. The worker receives this
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wage for every hour of the forty hours offered, not only for the fortieth
hour. Therefore, the worker’s surplus is the difference between $30 and
the amount that the worker would have been willing to accept for each
of the first thirty-nine hours per week.115 This is depicted in Figure 8 as
the area above the supply curve and below the horizontal line at the
market wage rate—triangle aWb.
Employers enjoy a surplus as well. Because the wage rate set at the
equilibrium point is lower than the wage rate they would have been
willing to pay for fewer hours, and because they pay that same wage rate
for all the hours up to the marginal hour, the employers gain as well.
The employers’ surplus is depicted in Figure 8 as the area under the
demand curve and above the horizontal line at the market wage
rate—triangle cWb. The existence of a surplus is a basic feature of an
efficient market: all voluntary transactions are win-win. In other words,
these voluntary transactions are Pareto improvements; all parties to them
gain, or at least they do not lose.
The higher the employment rate, the greater the surplus enjoyed by
both employers and employees. This occurs because the space of both
triangles increases as the employment rate rises. Therefore, mandated
benefits that result in a lower employment level decrease the economic
gains of both employers and employees. Employees who maintain their
jobs do not benefit from the mandated benefits even though their wage
rate does not decrease by the full cost of the mandated benefit to their
employers. This is depicted in Figure 9.

115. In other words, the employee would receive a surplus of $20 ($30–$10) on the
first hour, $15 ($30–$15) on the twentieth hour and so on, for the first thirty-nine
worker-hours a week.
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FIGURE 9
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The workers providing the L’ worker-hours—the workers who maintained
their jobs after the enactment of the mandated benefits—realized a
workers’ surplus of acdW before the benefits were provided. This is
clearly larger than the surplus of a’b’W’, the surplus realized after the
benefits were provided.116
B. Redistribution to Some of the Employees
There are two exceptions to the general inability of mandated benefits
to redistribute income from employers to any of the employees: (1)
minimum wage laws and (2) benefits having objective values greater
than the values that the employees place on them.
1. Minimum Wage Laws
Employees who earned a below minimum wage rate and, because of
minimum wage laws, received an increase in their wages that was not
offset by a reduction in any other part of their compensation package,
such as free food or other fringe benefits, are better off as a result of the
minimum wage laws. Note that employees as a group are not better off
116.
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because, according to the basic framework, if the wage rate did not
decrease, the employment level did. Therefore, some employees paid
with their jobs for the benefits enjoyed by the employees who
maintained their jobs and benefited from a wage increase.
Any mandated benefit can have this effect on employees earning the
minimum wage. If the employees’ compensation package does not
include any voluntarily provided benefits—fringe benefits—then upon
enactment of a new mandated benefit, the employer cannot reduce the
employees’ wage rate due to the minimum wage laws.117 But this is true
only in the short term. In the long run, these employees will end up
paying for the benefit indirectly. Because the employer will strive to
return to its pre-mandated benefit output, the employees will not receive
wage rate increases that they otherwise would have received without the
mandated benefit.
2. Benefits Having an “Objective Value” Greater than the
Value Employees Place on Them
Mandated benefits may have redistribution effects if there is a
difference between the employees’ subjective evaluation of the benefits
and the benefits’ objective worth. This usually occurs when the benefit
is the result of paternalism. Policymakers operate under the assumption
that employees undervalue certain benefits, such as savings for
retirement,118 which means that these benefits have an objective value
greater than their subjective value to the employees.
A heightened subjective value of the benefits can affect the size of the
gain conferred on employees by the mandate. However, when the
objective value is higher than the employees’ subjective valuation of the
benefits, redistribution takes place. Wage rates decrease only by the
value the employees place on the benefits, and the additional cost results
in a lower employment level.
Employees who maintain their jobs after the provision of the
mandated benefit enjoy a compensation package with a greater objective
value than its value prior to the provision benefit. Hence, the mandated
117. See Gruber & Krueger, supra note 12, at 139 (noting that mandated health
insurance may have greater adverse effects on the employment level, that is, less shifting
of costs through lower wages, because the minimum wage is likely to be more of a
constraint for uninsured workers).
118. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological
Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1282–83 (1991).
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benefits transferred some wealth to them. The wealth was transferred
from two sources: (1) employers and (2) employees who quit because
they misjudged the objective value of the benefits.
The employers lost because their profits decreased as a result of the
decreased output at the new equilibrium point. The mandated benefits
produced a net downward shift of the demand curve, as is shown in
Figure 4. The vertical distance is the difference between the employees’
subjective value of the benefits and the cost of the benefits. This
difference is the tax component. At the new equilibrium point, the
employment level is lower; therefore, the output is smaller. Employers
prefer a higher output because they make a profit on that additional
output. Profit is only possible at the prebenefit labor costs. Employers
lose this incremental profit as a consequence of the mandated benefit.
Employees who lost their jobs as a result of the mandated benefit
transfer wealth to those who stayed. By leaving the job, the employees
prevented the wage rate from decreasing by the full cost of providing the
benefit. The loss incurred by employees who left their jobs is the difference
between the subjective value they placed on the benefits and the
objective or real value of the benefits. The labor supply decreased by
more than it would have had the employees valued the benefit correctly.
The employees who left the workplace because of the mandated benefit,
who would not have left had they known the objective value of the
mandated benefit, transferred wealth to the employees who maintained
their jobs. The employees who stayed on the job enjoy a compensation
package that includes the objective value of the mandated benefit. This
occurs although they only paid, by way of a wage reduction, for their
subjective valuation of the benefits.
Generally, no redistribution can take place from employers to employees.
Both exceptions to this rule describe government intervention that results in
increased labor costs due to the provision of compensation that has real
value to the employees but whose cost is not fully borne by the
employees who stay on the job.119 In the case of a minimum wage, the
law forbids the wage reduction; in the case of all other mandated
benefits, the excessive decline in labor supply prevents the wage
reduction. This decline in the employment level is excessive because it
is due to the employees’ undervaluation of the benefits.
There is an important difference between minimum wage laws and
mandated benefits that have a greater objective than subjective value.
Employees who were laid off in the case of minimum wage laws are
probably the weakest ones.120 With other forms of mandated benefits,
119.
120.
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the employees who leave their jobs due to their subjectively low
valuation of the new benefits require a higher compensation package;
thus, they may have a greater endowment.
VI. ACCOMMODATION MANDATES REDISTRIBUTE INCOME BETWEEN
GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES
Summers noted that wage rigidity might form an exception to his
model when employers are required to “pay different workers the same
wage even though the cost of providing benefits differs.”121 This
includes, for example, limiting an employer’s ability to reduce a
worker’s wages when the employer pays a higher health insurance
premium because of the employee’s advanced age.122 Summers viewed
this as an efficiency problem; he assumed that employers would find a
way to avoid hiring people with high mandated benefits costs.123
Christine Jolls developed this wage rigidity exception, comprehensively
examining its redistributive effects.124 She analyzed mandated benefits
targeted at specific groups of employees—in her usage, “accommodation
mandates”—which ordinarily is how costs of providing the benefit
differ.125 Jolls showed that if limitations on both wages and employment
levels are binding, mandated benefits might have a redistributive
effect.126 The mandated benefits improve the relative position of the
targeted group members compared to all other employees.127 The
likely to lose their jobs due to an increase in minimum wage are those who have the least
marketable skills).
121. Summers, supra note 4, at 181. With regard to minimum wage laws, Summers
commented that the wage rigidity they cause has similar effects under both tax-financed
programs and mandated benefits; thus, they are not relevant when comparing the two
social tools. See id. at 181–82.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 181.
124. Jolls, supra note 2 passim.
125. Parental leave programs for parents are an example of this.
126. Jolls further analyzed what happens when restrictions constrain employers
from differentiating wages, but not employment levels. She posited that an antidiscrimination
law itself has similar effects to accommodation benefits in this context and should
therefore be analyzed in the same way. Id. This latter point has important implications
in determining Congress’s power to enact various federal employment laws under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a point more fully developed by
Jolls in another paper. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001).
127. Because the targeted employees receive a benefit, the cost of which is borne by
all employees, the targeted employees are relatively better off.
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employer’s labor costs increase, but the employer is not permitted to
offset the costs by reducing only the wages of the employees that are
helped by the mandated benefits. Therefore, all employees, including
those who are not aided by the mandated benefits, share equally in the
cost of providing the benefits.
As Jolls pointed out, the extent of the actual redistribution depends on
two combined factors: (1) the size of the difference between the value of
the benefits to the targeted employees and the benefits’ cost to the
employer, referred to as the “net tax” component of the mandated
benefits, and (2) the percentage of targeted employees out of the total
number of employees.128 If the tax component and the percentage of
targeted employees are relatively large, it is possible that the mandated
benefits will make even the targeted employees worse off, while the
targeted employees’ relative position compared to the other employees
will improve.129 This effect may still satisfy a policymaker’s redistribution
motive because it will narrow inequality between those two groups at the
same workplace, assuming that the targeted employees were initially
disadvantaged. When the tax component and the percentage of targeted
employees are both relatively small, the targeted mandated benefits will
have a normal and actual redistribution effect.130 Wealth will be
transferred from everyone to the targeted employees because the
targeted employees are the only ones to benefit from the mandate,
though everyone shares with them in the cost.
VII. BEYOND TRADITIONAL ACCOMMODATION MANDATES
This Part demonstrates that a number of real world mandates
disproportionately target or benefit a particular discrete demographic
group that could be identified in advance. Nevertheless, these types of
accommodation mandates differ from those discussed by Jolls in that
they are unintended by policymakers and might redistribute wealth in the
direction opposite from that which society usually views as desirable.
The mandates that Jolls discussed could hurt their intended beneficiaries
if restrictions on wage and employment differentials were not binding.131
128. Jolls, supra note 2, at 249–50.
129. Id.
130. The targeted employees will be made better off by getting a benefit that they
value at more than their wage decrease. The benefit is financed by a reduction in the
wages of all employees, including the nontargeted employees, who do not share in the
benefit. This is, in effect, a transfer from the nontargeted to the targeted employees.
131. The wage could be reduced by more than the value of the benefits to the
targeted employees. Alternatively, if the wage were binding, employers could refrain
from hiring targeted employees, thus increasing unemployment rates among the targeted
group members.
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Conversely, these mandates are ones in which, if restrictions on wage and
employment differentials bind, groups to whom society would normally
want to redistribute—women and lower compensated employees—will
be made worse off.
Moreover, in some of the examples presented, the redistribution
occurs even in the absence of an antidiscrimination rule. This happens
because the wage rigidity is the outcome of transaction costs that bar the
employer from adjusting wages to offset the differences in values that
employees place on the mandates.132
A. Wealth
Wealth differences do not actually deal with different groups, but
rather they vary along a continuum of workers. However, such
variations can be discussed as the differences between the values that the
rich and the poor employees place on the benefits.133
Cash is always preferred to a benefit because it has the advantage of
liquidity. Because cash can always be used to purchase the benefit, it
gives the individual a greater freedom of choice. But poor individuals
are even more likely to prefer cash to benefits because they have a
higher marginal utility for marginal changes in their wealth. They need
income to purchase goods that are more of a necessity to them. Relative
to such goods, the benefits offered by the employer are viewed as
luxurious and therefore have lower utility.134
In addition to the difference in their marginal utilities of income, rich
and poor workers also vary in their tax brackets. When mandated
benefits are correlated with tax advantages, such as tax exemptions or
deductions, it is clear that high income employees value the benefits

132. See discussion infra Part VII.C.
133. In most cases where workers are separated into groups, a closer examination
would reveal a continuum. For administrative reasons, the grouping is done by arbitrarily
drawing a line. This line is obvious in the context of tax and transfer systems, as when
only poor people are entitled to certain benefits—a policy that involves great distortions,
see generally Shaviro, supra note 101—but it can also be found in many other contexts,
such as in the difference between an independent contractor and an employee.
134. See Joseph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rankand-File Compensation, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 603 (1994) (reasoning that low income
employees would put a lower dollar value on retirement benefits than high income
employees because they need most of their cash compensation to pay for bare necessities,
such as food, rent, and child care, and stating that the same is true for medical insurance
that is beyond necessity level).
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more than low income employees.135 Tax advantages are given to
taxpayers as a means of inducing certain behaviors perceived by the
policymaker to be desirable.
A policy that both mandates and subsidizes the benefits seems to be
implausible; if the policymaker has already decided to coerce a certain
behavior, then what use could be found for incentives? However, this can
happen in at least two situations: (1) when a benefit is not directly
mandated, but the employer must offer it to every employee if the
employer wants to offer it at all, and there are tax incentives to induce
employers to offer such benefits;136 and (2) when administrative reasons,
such as the difficulties associated with distinguishing between private and
business expenses, lead to the exclusion of the benefits from the tax basis.137
Empirical studies suggest that rising income is positively correlated
with an increasing proportion of benefits in total compensation.138 As
long as there is a clear relation between wealth and the subjective value
of the mandated benefits, a benefit has greater value to high income
employees than to low income employees. Assuming that employers do
not take income level into account and do not reduce the wages of high
income employees to a greater extent than low income employees,
mandated benefits redistribute income from poor to rich employees.
Assume, for example, that prior to the enactment of a mandated
benefit, a rich employee earns $100 per hour and a poor employee earns
$10 per hour. A mandate requires the employer to contribute ten percent
of its employees’ wages to retirement accounts on their behalf. The
employer will therefore reduce the wage paid to the rich employee by
$10 per hour and reduce the wage paid to the poor employee by $1 per
hour. Both employees will probably value the benefit at less than its
cost, as most people prefer to have the ability to choose between present
and future consumption. The mandate is paternalistic because it coerces
135. Exemptions or deductions shelter income from tax according to the marginal
tax rate of the taxpayer. High income taxpayers pay taxes at higher tax rates than low
income taxpayers, and they therefore derive greater benefits from the deductions or
exemptions.
136. See Bankman, supra note 134, at 599–600; Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax
Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It “Still” Viable as a Means of
Increasing Retirement Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 18 (1993).
137. An example is the tax treatment of fringe benefits.
138. See generally Stephen A. Woodbury, Substitution Between Wage and
Nonwage Benefits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (1983). The amount of the increase in
benefits that was attributed to rising marginal taxes and the amount that was attributed to
rising incomes remains unclear. But this is of no relevance to the argument here. One
researcher suggested the following explanation: rising incomes increase the value of time
to workers, so high income employees prefer benefit programs that assign others to take
care of their personal administrative details, such as insurance and pension. See Richard A.
Lester, Benefits as a Preferred Form of Compensation, 33 S. ECON. J. 488, 490 (1967).
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the employees into saving for retirement.139
But compared with rich employees, poor employees will place a
relatively lower value on the benefit. In this example, the poor employees
may place a value of $.70 on each dollar of mandated savings, while
high income employees may place a value of $.99 on each dollar of
mandated savings. The differences in valuation are the result of differences
in marginal utilities of current consumption, differences in tax benefits,
which were not mentioned in this example. There is also an additional
reason that is relevant in the context of this specific example: the ability
of the rich employees to offset the effects of the mandated benefit by
reducing their voluntary savings.140 Unless the employer reduces the
wages of the rich employees by a greater percentage than it reduces the
wages of the poor employees, the mandated benefit will have a
regressive redistributive effect, transferring wealth from poor employees
to rich employees.
Alternatively, specific mandated benefits may be more beneficial to
low income employees. Examples would include basic medical insurance
(assuming it is not available to nonworkers) and anti-sexual harassment
laws141 (assuming that poor women are more vulnerable to sexual
harassment at work).
B. Gender
1. Overtime Pay
One well-known difference between the sexes is the number of hours
spent at work. Men tend to work longer hours than women and therefore
benefit from mandated overtime pay to a greater extent than women,
who generally tend not to work overtime.142 According to the Current

139. The policymaker assumes that people are myopic—they do not save enough
for retirement and will regret it when old. Therefore, the policymaker forces employees
to save certain minimal amounts by mandating it.
140. The richer the employees are and the higher their preferences for savings
(future consumption), the greater the likelihood that the employees already voluntarily
saved for retirement prior to the enactment of the mandated benefit. Therefore, the value
that they place on the benefit may reach 100%—assuming, realistically, zero transaction
costs incurred in decreasing the level of the voluntary savings.
141. These can also be seen as targeted mandated benefits—accommodation
benefits, as defined by Donohue. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 903–04.
142. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 requires the payment of time-and-a-half
wages for overtime. 29 U.S.C § 207(a)(1) (2000).
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Population Survey (CPS) of 2001,143 the average working hours of
women holding full time wage and salary jobs in the nonagricultural
industries is 40.9 hours a week compared to 44.2 hours for men. This
translates to a gap of 3.3 hours per week. Within the overtime zone, the
rate of women’s participation drops dramatically. Out of the total
population of workers working more than forty hours, 67.5% are men
and only 32.5% are women.144 This means that two out of three
employees who may be eligible for overtime pay are men. In the
extended workload category—those working more than forty-nine hours
per week—72.2% are men.145 Hence, in the group of workers eligible
for at least nine hours of overtime pay, seven out of ten are men.
Empirical studies suggest that employers reduce the regular hourly wage
they pay to offset the costs of overtime premium changes.146 Thus, the
costs of overtime payment are shifted to the employees.
Both Gruber’s study of the incidence of mandated maternity
benefits147 and Jolls’s paper suggest that redistribution between the sexes
may not take place.148 Gruber found that employers shifted the costs of
additional insurance premiums to women who were the likely
beneficiaries of that mandate.149 Furthermore, Jolls has argued that
occupational segregation may preclude redistribution in either direction
within the context of gender.150 But, as Jolls points out, segregation is
declining, so the overtime rules might lower women’s wages while
benefiting men. As for the Gruber study, it looked at the 1970s;151
according to Jolls’s paper, occupational segregation has decreased
substantially since then.152 In addition, there is a salient difference if the
mandate is not on its face targeted at a specific group. The examples
discussed in this Part are substantially different from the mandated
benefits that Gruber studied.153
143. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 22: Persons at Work in Nonagricultural
Industries by Age, Sex, Race, Marital Status, and Usual Full- or Part-Time Status
(2001), http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpssaat22.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See STEPHEN J. TREJO, DOES THE STATUTORY OVERTIME PREMIUM DISCOURAGE
LONG WORKWEEKS? passim (IZA Discussion Paper No. 373, 2001); Stephen J. Trejo,
The Effects of Overtime Pay Regulation on Worker Compensation, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
719, 720 (1991).
147. See Gruber, supra note 7.
148. Women pay for the benefits they receive by accepting reduced wages.
149. Gruber, supra note 7, at 639.
150. Jolls, supra note 2, at 268–70.
151. Gruber, supra note 7, at 623–24.
152. See Jolls, supra note 2, at 287 (noting, however, that occupational segregation
is still quite significant).
153. Gruber studied health insurance coverage, the cost of which is measured explicitly
and accurately by the additional premium charged. See Gruber, supra note 7, at 622.
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It is a plausible assumption that employers reduce the regular hourly
wage of all their employees, not only of the employees who are paid an
overtime premium. Otherwise, employees who are paid an overtime
premium will refuse to work overtime, as they might believe the
employer overestimated the subjective value of the premium.
Thus, it is plausible to assume that the overtime pay mandate is
effectively binding, not because of antidiscrimination laws, which are not
present in this context, but because of the employers’ transaction costs
and workplace norms.154 Employers do not lower the regular wages of the
benefited employees and hold the wages of the nonbenefited employees
constant. Rather, the outcome is an unintended redistribution from women to
men, as the benefits of the overtime pay mandate are concentrated with
men, while the costs are borne by all employees—women and men alike.
2. Vesting Requirements
Yet another difference between men and women is the number of
years that they stay in one workplace. Women tend to experience work
interruptions much more frequently than do men.155 Therefore, there is a
gap in tenure between men and women.156 Certain mandated benefits are
provided only to employees who satisfy waiting, recency, and vesting
periods.157 Rules governing mandated contributions to employees’ pension
plans are a good example of this requirement.158 Antidiscrimination
154. See BEWLEY, supra note 24, at 41–56, 70–85 (noting that employees compare
wages and the importance of internal pay equity).
155. See Mary E. O’Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages
and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1421, 1453 (1993); Camilla E. Watson, The Pension
Game: Age- and Gender-Based Inequities in the Retirement System, 25 GA. L. REV. 1,
20–22 (1990).
156. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 1: Median Years of Tenure with Current
Employer for Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Age and Sex, Selected Years,
1983–2000, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.t01.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2003) (showing that men consistently experience longer working periods with the same
employer than women do).
157. See O’Connell, supra note 155, at 1450–60 (defining and explaining waiting
periods, vesting requirements, and recency requirements).
158. The Internal Revenue Code allows employers to forfeit the right to 100% of
the employee’s accrued benefit derived from employer contribution if the employee did
not complete at least five years of service. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A) (2000). The Code also
allows the nonforfeitable percentage to gradually increase over four years, starting with
the completion of three years of service and ending in the seventh year. I.R.C. §
411(a)(2)(B) (2000). Similar rules can be found in § 203(a)(2)(A) and (B) of ERISA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2000).
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clauses in the tax code mandate that employers must provide their high
and low income employees with pension benefits at the same ratio of
benefits to total compensation.159 Because there are tax incentives to
providing the benefits to high income employees, employers often
provide pension plans, and because of antidiscrimination rules, a large
percentage of employees receive them.
In the context of differences in wealth, this Article previously
discussed that such benefits might be to the detriment of the low paid
employees. But even assuming that the employer takes into account the
smaller value that low income employees place on the benefits and shifts
a lower percentage of the benefits’ costs to the low income employees,
there still is a group of employees who value the benefits even less and
are not being compensated for that by higher wages. This group includes
employees who move from one workplace to another before satisfying
the vesting requirement,160 who thus cannot keep the employers’
contributions to their plans.161 Women compose a large percentage of
this group. The employer does not know ahead of time that these employees
will not stay long enough to satisfy the vesting requirement; therefore,
the employer does not pay them a higher wage that would reflect the fact
that these employees do not benefit from the plan. Employees who think
they will not stay long enough in the same workplace to satisfy the
minimum service requirement place zero value on the mandated
pension plan, but their wages do not reflect their reduced future benefit.
They therefore suffer either a wage decrease—compared to the other
employees—or lower employment, depending on the elasticity of their
labor supply.
This results in a redistribution of wealth from a group of relatively
weak employees to employees who tend to be better off. The
redistribution is caused by the different values that different employees
place on the mandate that they receive. High income employees place
greater value on mandated pension benefits than low income employees.
For employees who do not intend to stay at least five (or sometimes
three) years in the same workplace, the benefit is completely worthless.
Women, especially married women of childbearing age, often belong to
this latter group.162
159. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)–(5) (2000).
160. See generally Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73
(1998) (discussing a broader group of employees, the “contingent employees,” defined to
include all employees who are not core employees—part time employees and those
working from home who lack job security and frequently move from one job to another,
which accounts for a rapidly growing percentage of the labor market).
161. See supra note 158.
162. See O’Connell, supra note 155, at 1453.

696

MARGOLIATH.DOC

[VOL. 40: 645, 2003]

1/14/2020 4:18 PM

The Many Faces of Mandates
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

These findings suggest that the differences in the values that employees
place on mandated benefits are not random; rather, they correlate with
family status and gender. It seems unlikely that employers adjust wages
or their hiring decisions to account for these differences. Unlike the case
of maternity health insurance studied by Gruber,163 the benefits of the
mandate are not explicitly tied to gender. Therefore, it is less likely that
employers will reduce men’s wages relative to women’s wages to reflect
the greater value that men place on such mandates.
3. Risk Aversion
Another difference between men and women seems to be work related
risk aversion. A recent study finds that single fathers are more averse to
work related risk than married fathers and that the latter are more risk
averse than male employees who do not have children.164 The research
also found a difference between the genders.165 The most safety oriented
group of men—single dads—has been found to have the same level of
risk aversion as the least safety oriented group of women—married
women without children.166 Safety related mandated benefits might be
very costly.
This last example may be classified as a transfer from men to women
because women place higher value on mandated safety measures. The
empirical basis for this example seems to be weaker than the overtime
pay and job tenure examples; therefore, the net redistribution effects of
these three examples may be a transfer from women to men.
Moreover, safety mandates are probably the strongest example of
mandates justified on a paternalistic basis. If viewed from this vantage, it
may be possible to differentiate between this example and the previous ones
and to see the mandate as benefiting men—even though they place a low
value on it. Men benefit from a safety mandate to a greater extent than do
women because men tend to take riskier jobs.167 This might offset the
redistributive effect derived from forcing men to pay the same price for
safety that women pay, despite the fact that men place a lower value on it.
163.
164.

See Gruber, supra note 7.
See THOMAS DELEIRE & HELEN LEVY, GENDER, OCCUPATION CHOICE AND THE
RISK OF DEATH AT WORK 15–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8574, 2001).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 15.
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C. Why Employers Would Not Offset Differences in Values
by Wage Adjustments
Under the framework of accommodation mandates developed by
Jolls, redistribution takes place only in the presence of fully binding
antidiscrimination laws.168 Otherwise, employers are able to shift the
costs to the benefited employees and prevent redistribution. In the above
examples—differences in wealth, overtime pay and vesting rules—no
antidiscrimination rules were present, yet redistribution was assumed to
take place.
What enables the redistribution? The answer is wage rigidity.
Antidiscrimination laws are merely one possible type of wage rigidity.
In the context of the examples presented above, the wage rigidities were
caused by transaction costs, workplace norms, and even general social
norms.
Social norms may prevent women from working overtime, even if
they would otherwise want to do so. Workplace norms may prevent
employers from reducing the regular wages of employees who work
overtime because employees can easily compare wage rates, although it
is more difficult to accurately assess the value of a benefit. Therefore,
employers may prefer to pay similar wage rates to all their employees
who do the same regular work. This may prevent turmoil among
employees who receive a relatively lower wage rate because the
employer believes that the employees place relatively high value on the
mandated benefits—in this example, the high premium paid for
overtime. Those employees may demand to be paid the same wage rate
as their peers, rejecting the employer’s claim regarding the higher value
that they allegedly place on the benefits.169
Transaction costs may reflect costs incurred by the employer in
obtaining the information necessary to offset the differences in values
that employees place on their mandated benefits. Employers need to be
able to measure these differences. Over the years, economists have
developed a few methods to measure what they call “the cash-equivalent
value of the benefit,”170 but it is widely accepted that there is no accurate
way to conduct these measurements.171 Most studies simply assume that
the employees’ value is equal to the employer’s cost—an assumption

168. See generally Jolls, supra note 2.
169. See BEWLEY, supra note 24, at 70–85 (describing the importance of internal
pay equity).
170. See DELEIRE & LEVY, supra note 164.
171. Id.

698

MARGOLIATH.DOC

[VOL. 40: 645, 2003]

1/14/2020 4:18 PM

The Many Faces of Mandates
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that is not helpful for conducting distributional analysis.172
Employers have only limited knowledge of the personal lives of their
employees. They can not assess the likelihood that specific employees
will stay with them for many years; hence, they do not know the value
that employees place on pension and other benefits that are subject to
vesting periods. As mentioned above, women on average tend to incur
more work interruptions than men. However, there are very substantial
differences among women in this respect, probably more than in the
context of maternity, and employers are unable to tell whether or not
their female employees are likely to stay with them for many years.
Administrative reasons are therefore significant bars to accurate wage
adjustments. Moreover, when taking into account the fact that labor
supply is highly inelastic relative to labor demand, employers will not be
willing to incur high administrative costs to adjust their employees’
wages because they can shift almost all of their costs to the employees as
a group.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Mandates come in many different shapes and sizes, and one needs to
size up the particular mandate under consideration in assessing (1) how
it compares to a tax-financed program from a distortionary standpoint,173
and (2) what the likely distributive effects will be. This Article has gone
beyond traditional accommodation mandates by looking at several
thought provoking cases, such as overtime and pension vesting, which
turn out to be just like accommodation mandates but have distributive
effects potentially running in the opposite direction. This Article also has
gone beyond the classic case of the distortions discussion—mandated
health insurance versus tax-financed government provided health care—
to explore situations in which exclusion of nonemployees seems
plausible and sensible.
Except in cases where mandated benefits are required to accomplish
policy goals that cannot be expressed in pecuniary terms, such as
guaranteeing actual employment and not merely the income from
labor,174 any mandated benefit can be replaced by a tax-financed
172. See Melissa Famulari & Marilyn E. Manser, Employer-Provided Benefits:
Employer Cost Versus Employee Value, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1989, at 24, 28.
173. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing excess burden).
174. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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program and vice versa. Both of these social policy tools can therefore
be defined as taxes. There is no difference between using a tax to
finance a government benefit and mandating the employer to provide the
benefit, thus inflicting a cost that theoretically is equal to a tax. Under
both scenarios, employers and employees will share the burden in the
same way according to the relative elasticities of labor supply and
demand. In some circumstances, a mandated benefit might be the more
appropriate social tool; in other circumstances, a tax-financed program
might be the best option. Hence, the selection of a tool to correct labor
market inefficiency should be made on a case-by-case basis.
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